

WEDNESDAY MORNING, 23 JUNE 1982

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# New Pressures Propel Talks On Arms Race

## Politics and Technology Feed the Superpowers' Fears

By Michael Getler  
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. and Soviet negotiators will sit down in Geneva next Tuesday in a renewed effort to brake the nuclear arms race, with two powerful new factors looming over the bargaining table that could push them toward agreement.

One is mostly political and bears most heavily on the Reagan administration. That is the extraordinary growth in Western Europe and the United States of popular movements demanding, in very simple terms, that the arms race halt.

The other factor is the march of U.S. military technology and weaponry that, unless checked by some agreement, has got to be causing increasing concern in Moscow.

Starting late in 1983 and continuing through the end of this decade, the United States is scheduled to deploy a series of new and highly accurate missiles and bombers that threaten to nullify the enormous investment Moscow has made in big land-based missiles. Those missiles, which have helped boost Moscow's role in global power politics, would become vulnerable as never before to American weapons.




The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—START—are aimed at producing big reductions in the intercontinental-range missiles, warheads and bombers of both sides. If the talks succeed, they could lower the risk of nuclear war by reducing the threat that either side could militarily neutralize the other in an all-out first strike. It is that threat, however implausible, that drives the arms race.

If the talks fail and the superpowers carry through on the new weapons programs under way, it "would result in almost a doubling of strategic weapons within a decade," according to the just-retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones.

Whether an unconstrained new round in the arms race would make either country's leadership feel more secure is impossible to say. But it would not give either side an advantage that would be militarily useable, says Jones.

As the accompanying chart shows, both superpowers are armed to the teeth. On balance, however, it would seem that the Soviet Union eventually could see its relative position worsen, as

## AS START TALKS BEGIN...

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES					
UNITED STATES			WARHEADS PER MISSILE	USSR	WARHEADS PER MISSILE
LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL- RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS (ICBMS) 	TITAN II	53	1	SS-II	580
	MINUTEMAN II	450	1	SS-13	60
	MINUTEMAN III	550	3	SS-17	150
				SS-18	308
TOTAL ICBMS		1,053		SS-19	300
TOTAL ICBM WARHEADS		2,100 approx.			1,398
SUBMARINE-BASED* BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMS) 	POSEIDON	320	10	GOLF & HOTEL	30
	TRIDENT I	224	8	SS-N-6	396
				SS-N-8 & 18	504
				TYPHOON	20
TOTAL SLBMS		544			950
TOTAL SLBM WARHEADS		5,000 approx.			1,500 approx.
BOMBERS 	B-52	347		BEAR	100
	FB-111	63		BISON	45
	TOTAL BOMBERS†	410		BACKFIRE	200
TOTAL MISSILES		1,597			345
TOTAL MISSILE WARHEADS		7,100			2,348
TOTAL MISSILES & BOMBERS		2,007			7,500
					2,693

\* Includes on the U.S. side: 20 Poseidon submarines with 320 Poseidon missiles, 11 Poseidon submarines with 176 Trident I Missiles and 2 Trident submarines with 48 Trident I missiles

Includes on Soviet side: 1 Golf and 7 Hotel class submarines, 25 Yankee-class submarines with 396 missiles, 36 Delta-class submarines with 504 missiles and 1 Typhoon submarine with 20 missiles

† Chart does not include number of bombs carried on bombers or more than 3,000 air-launched cruise missiles to be deployed on U.S. bombers. Also not shown are several hundred cruise missiles to be deployed on U.S. submarines.

SOURCE: U.S. GOVERNMENT UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES

By Neil McCrory — The Washington Post

least in the paper calculations that are used to gauge power, if the United States pursues all the programs now under way.

The increasing accuracy of new weapons is forcing both superpowers to grapple with a problem they did not have to worry about for much of the past two decades: where to base their nuclear weapons.

In this country, this problem is illustrated most dramatically by the continued inability to find a home that makes sense and is safe from attack for the new land-based MX missile.

For the Soviet Union, however, the problem seems even greater because more than 70 percent of its nuclear striking power sits on top of what will become increasingly vulnerable land-based missiles.

The United States has more of its striking power underwater—in missile-firing submarines largely invulnerable to attack. The American submarines and the missiles they carry, as well as those in prospect for the future, are viewed as superior to their counterparts in the Soviet undersea armada.

Therein lies a major, future dilemma for Moscow. If its land-based missiles become vulnerable to attack from new American missiles, should the Kremlin invest billions more rubles to shift more forces to sea, an operating arena where the United

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Reagan Fills Intelligence Job

WASHINGTON, June 22 (UPI) — President Reagan announced today that he intended to nominate Charles Jarvis Meyers, a Denver lawyer and former dean at Stanford University, to be a member of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. In addition, Mr. Reagan named Edward Sulzberger, a New York realtor, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships.

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ANZUS on Nuclear Ships

CANBERRA, Australia—Opposition leader Bill Hayden backed down on his threat to ban visits by nuclear-armed warships to Australian ports if he became prime minister.

His move followed a statement by the three partners in the ANZUS security alliance—the United States, Australia and New Zealand—that stressed the importance of access for U.S. warships to Australian and New Zealand ports.

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**ARMS RACE...Continued**

States already has a technological advantage?

It is questions such as these that could figure prominently in the new talks and that give at least some U.S. officials the feeling that conditions are present that eventually could lead to some agreement.

In Washington's view, there are other conditions that also may make Moscow interested.

Although experts debate the extent and impact of Moscow's current economic woes on Soviet policy, the White House seems convinced that the Soviets have serious financial problems, and President Reagan, sources say, is intrigued by this.

Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev is also nearing the end of his reign, and it is widely held here that the Soviet chief does want some sort of new arms agreement, and a return to an earlier form of detente in which access to American technology, trade and credit were easier.

But there are also problems emanating from Washington. The Reagan administration's sometimes strident rhetoric about nuclear matters has created much of the political protest that is pressing in on its policies.

The president, on March 31, also claimed that "on balance, the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority" in strategic striking power. While many former officials and specialists disagree, the president's view is reflected in a START proposal that would require Moscow to make much greater cuts in its forces than Washington must make. That, too, is a new factor because the two powers had approached all previous arms negotiations on the basis that a rough parity existed.

Reagan's proposal calls for numerical equality. Both sides would reduce the total number of individual missile warheads by roughly one-third to a level of 5,000 each. No more than half of these could be on land-based missiles, and each side would be allowed 850 land- or submarine-based missiles.

The idea is to force upon Moscow a sizeable cutback in warheads on their land-based missiles, which are the most accurate and, therefore, the most threatening.

Reagan wants to concentrate first on reducing these potential first-strike weapons because they are also the most vulnerable to attack and thus have a "use them or lose them" quality.

Brezhnev has rejected Reagan's proposals as "lopsided" and "unrealistic," aimed at protecting U.S. advantages in bombers, submarine missiles and cruise missiles, and meant to tip the current balance of power. He has, nevertheless, agreed to the talks and the idea of eventual reductions, but first proposes an immediate freeze that would ban new weapons.

Even U.S. officials who are optimistic about some agreement in the long run say the chances for quick success at Geneva, perhaps over the next year, are "almost nonexistent."

They expect Moscow to continue trying to manipulate public opinion, especially in Western Europe, to force a U.S. backdown on key points and to wait and see how the freeze movement grows in this country. They also expect the Soviets not to

budge from their initial position while the future of the MX remains in doubt.

On the other hand, top officials here say Reagan wants progress on START before he agrees to a summit with Brezhnev, which the Soviet leader has proposed for this fall.

Paradoxically, some officials believe it could be the scheduled December, 1983, deployment of new U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe—missiles that are covered in a separate negotiation and not in START—that breaks open the arms control logjam.

These weapons, meant to balance some 300 Soviet SS20 missiles in place, are being discussed in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) talks dealing with European-based weapons that began in Geneva last November.

The U.S. missiles fit the pattern of increased threats to Soviet forces and command posts. The Pershing, in particular, can reach Soviet territory and supposedly hit targets with high accuracy and little warning.

It is widely assumed among many U.S. and Soviet specialists that at some point the START and INF talks will be merged.

There has been no real progress on INF, officials say. The Soviets claim a balance in European-based power already exists. They argue that the British and French have roughly 300 missiles, about the same as the number of SS20s, so there is no reason for new American weapons.

The U.S. strategy at START, officials say, will be to concentrate on getting the Soviets to accept the idea that land-based missiles are the most politically destabilizing weapons and must be negotiated first.

The Soviets are certain to immediately point out that the United States has a larger bomber force and is building 3,000 to 4,000 new long-range cruise missiles to put on those bombers, plus several hundred more cruise missiles for ships and submarines.

The U.S. response is that these weapons can take hours to reach their targets and thus are not the crucial problem. The administration has said it will "deal" with these weapons but does not want to negotiate about them in the initial phase.

Furthermore, when bombers do come up for discussion, the United States will point out that the Soviets have massive air defense systems that must be included in the calculations. The United States is also seeking to count the Backfire bomber as a long-range weapon even though Moscow says it is only for regional use.

When cruise missiles come up, Washington will point out that Moscow also has a good number of

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**Bonn backs women for armed forces**

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

BONN, West Germany — West Germany's defense minister has said the government plans to accept women non-combat volunteers in the armed forces and to extend military service for men to make up for a manpower shortage.

Defense Minister Hans Apel told a news conference unless these steps are taken, a falling birth rate will reduce the armed forces by 1995 from their present strength of 495,000 to 290,000.

Apel released a 131-page long-term planning report by a military commission that recommended increasing the time conscripts must serve from 15 to at least 18 months in the middle of the 1980s. The report also recommended that armed forces emulate all other NATO members and allow women to serve as non-combatant soldiers.

The report gave no estimate of the number of women envisaged, but in the past military sources said about 30,000 volunteers would be needed to make up for the decline in young men reaching military age, a decline attributed partially to the birth-control bill. The armed forces now have only 65 women, all of them officers in the medical corps recruited since 1975.

The report said there is no constitutional barrier to allowing women to volunteer for duty in transport, communications, medical, supply and staff jobs as the constitution only prohibits their bearing arms.

The use of women was recommended not only because of the shortage of men but also to give women the same rights as men, the report said. It said this is in line with United Nations resolutions on non-discrimination.

Apel came out in favor of the recommendation, but said the interior and justice ministers will have to be consulted before it is implemented.

The report also discussed the place of West Germany in the Western alliance.

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**DATA BASE: U.S. ARMY TROOPS ABROAD**

1. WEST GERMANY.....	211,340	81.3%
2. SOUTH KOREA .....	28,467	11.0%
3. PANAMA .....	7,862	3.0%
4. ITALY .....	4,282	1.6%
5. JAPAN .....	2,502	1.0%

SOURCE: DOD; Figures for March 31, 1982; percentage of Army abroad

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## GENERAL IS CHOSEN TO RULE ARGENTINA

**Air Force and Navy Oppose the  
Naming of an Army Officer  
— 2 Senior Aides Quit**

BUENOS AIRES, June 22 (AP) — The Argentine Army announced today that it would "assume the responsibility" for ruling the country and, despite objections from its junta partners, named a retired general as President.

The announcement came after a top air force general and a navy admiral resigned from the Government to protest the appointment of Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Benito Antonio Bignone as President.

There were reports that the air force and navy would pull altogether out of the day-to-day running of Argentina because a civilian was not appointed.

The two services were described as adamantly opposed to the naming of another army general after Lieut. Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri led Argentina to defeat in the war with Britain over the Falkland Islands.

### A Reluctant Compromise

Sources close to the military said the three service chiefs in the junta would confer again only on purely military matters.

It was understood that General Bignone, a 54-year-old conservative administrator, was a reluctant compromise chosen to avoid the collapse of the 6-year-old military regime.

In a communiqué broadcast nationwide on radio and television, the army pledged to lead a "short-term transition Government" aimed at restoring civilian political rule "by the early months of 1984."

General Bignone, who served as secretary general in the presidential palace after the 1976 coup that deposed President Isabel Martínez de Perón, will take office on July 1, according to the communiqué.

The Interior Minister, Maj. Gen. Alfredo St. Jean of the army, was expected to continue until then as interim President.

General St. Jean assumed the presidency after the military ousted General Galtieri on Friday in the wake of Falkland fighting.

### 'Facts That Are Publicly Known'

Argentina seized the islands on April 2. Britain recaptured them on June 14, taking thousands of Argentine prisoners.

In resigning today as Planning Secretary, Gen. José Miret of the air force cited "the facts that are publicly known." He apparently meant the objections of air force and navy officers to the naming of an army man rather than a civilian to succeed General Galtieri.

## ARMS RACE...Continued

them, even though they are mostly of a few hundred miles in range and primarily useful for attacks on shipping.

Aside from wanting to stop the Pershing deployment, the big prizes for the Soviets would be curbs on the MX missile and the new Trident II submarine-based missile now in development.

Although the fate of the MX has grabbed the headlines in recent years, the Trident II is perhaps the most important new weapons development of this decade, one that could alter future forces and strategies.

This is so because, if it works as advertised, the missile, for the first time, would give submarine-based weapons sufficient accuracy to knock out Soviet missiles in protected underground shelters. Strategically, this means both an invulnerable and effective force.

A key element of American START strategy, however, is that nothing in the U.S. proposal would prevent fielding MX, Trident II or the new B1 and Stealth bombers. Under this idea, if both sides agree to reduce the level of forces, they are free to deploy whichever weapons they want to make up those smaller forces.

Thus, unless the Soviets offer a deal that is too good to turn down, U.S. officials say MX is not up for grabs. So, while the overall numerical threat from each other's forces may be reduced, the arms race—in terms of the U.S. taxpayer—will probably not come to an end.

Some specialists have suggested the U.S. propose a deal in which MX is dropped in return for the Soviets removing their 308 big SS18 missiles. But administration officials say such ideas were discarded before they ever got to Reagan.

Officials claim even if there were such a deal, it would still leave Moscow with a unilateral advantage in big missiles because even the next biggest Soviet missile, the SS19, is significantly larger than the existing U.S. Minuteman III.

It is three years since former president Carter and Brezhnev signed the second strategic arms limitation agreement, SALT II, which was supposed to put a ceiling on the strategic forces of both sides at roughly current levels. But that treaty was never ratified here for a variety of reasons, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Aside from the Reagan emphasis on deep reductions rather than limitations, there are other major differences between SALT and America's opening START position.

The Social Action Minister, Vice Adm. Carlos Lacoste, also announced his resignation today.

In what may have been their last unified act, the three service commanders pledged earlier in the day to return Argentina to democratic rule by 1984. They also agreed to meet with "representative sectors" of the population to plan political, economic and social changes.

When the armed forces overthrew the populist Perón Government, they did not give any timetable for returning power to civilian politicians. General Galtieri, who was to have stayed in of-

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## Taiwan Acts to Widen Its Nuclear Technology

TAIPEI, Taiwan, June 22 (Reuters) — Taiwan has announced plans to reduce its almost complete reliance on the United States for nuclear expertise by seeking French technology to reprocess its weapons-grade nuclear wastes.

Officials said the move, announced yesterday by the head of the Taiwan Power Company, showed that the Nationalist Government intended to insure continued operation of its nuclear power stations at a time when its relations with the United States were uncertain.

The officials also restated pledges that Taiwan, which has two nuclear power plants and is building two more, did not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

Cooperation on nuclear technology between the United States and Taiwan was downgraded to unofficial, private levels following Washington's diplomatic recognition of Peking in 1979.

The Taiwan Power Company chairman, Chen Lan-Kao, told Parliament yesterday that negotiations on the disposal and reprocessing of nuclear wastes were being held with French Government officials and the Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires, a subsidiary of the French Atomic Energy Commission.

They involve removal of bombers and the weapons they carry from the initial calculations, and a focus on the actual number of missiles and warheads in the field rather than the number of "launchers" in which missiles are housed.

Addressing the United Nations session on disarmament last week, Reagan mentioned the need for "effective verification" of these complex agreements eight times in his speech.

Yet officials say the United States has only just begun to do the detailed work necessary to figure out how to verify possible agreements. Like a lot of things about the negotiations that open next week, American officials say figuring out precisely what will be necessary depends on what the Soviets say and do.

He said, "The ballot boxes are tightly locked up."

The Argentine people put aside political differences to back General Galtieri in the military campaign to recover the Falklands from Britain. But after Argentines paid for the fight with lives, money and national pride, sentiment turned toward a return of democratic government.

"The nation belongs to everyone," the Buenos Aires newspaper La Nación said in its lead editorial today. "The return of democratic institutions must be in sight. The blood that was spilled urgently demands it."

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# U.S. denies sabotaging detente, blames Soviets

By Glenn Emery  
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

The State Department vigorously denied yesterday charges made Monday by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the United States was destroying the remaining "bridges" of detente between the two superpowers and insisted the responsibility for improved relations rests squarely with the Russians.

"The Soviet Union is well aware that we are prepared for improvements in all aspects of our relations if there is real, not just cosmetic, moderation in Soviet international actions. Until that happens — in deed and not just in words — the responsibility for tension is the Soviet Union's," State Department spokesman Dean Fischer said.

"The point is that the United States cannot ignore Soviet international actions which inevitably affect our bilateral relationship, such as the Soviet invasion and continuing occupation of Afghanistan and the Soviet-supported repression in Poland."

The Reagan administration decided on Friday on extend sanctions against the Soviets, citing a lack of improvement in the state of martial law in Poland. Those sanctions prohibit the sale to the Soviet Union of American technology that would be used to build a natural gas pipeline to Western Europe.

"The pipeline project is already behind schedule. Our action will further impede it. The unavailability of U.S. equipment and technology, at a minimum, will increase its cost and require the expenditure of additional scarce resources by the Soviets," Fischer said.

"The president's action to reaffirm and broaden the scope of the sanctions... is a clear demonstration of our deep dissatisfaction with the absence of progress toward the restoration of basic human rights in Poland."

Fischer added, "We recognize that this decision poses some costs for our allies; however, American firms are bearing significant losses as well."

Some Western European allies, particularly West Germany, have been reticent about opposing the proposed Soviet pipeline because of the boost it would give their economies.

Last week, in an address before the United Nations, Gromyko announced the Soviet Union was adopting a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. While the statement was well received at the United Nations, in Washington it was greeted with scorn and skepticism as being merely "cosmetic" and duplicitous.

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## Republicans block nuke freeze vote

Republicans used a parliamentary tactic yesterday to temporarily block consideration of a nuclear freeze measure by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The move came after Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham, D-N.Y., introduced an amendment calling for a "mutual and verifiable freeze" on U.S. and Soviet nuclear

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## LTV Unit to Sell Version of Disposable Weapon

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

DALLAS—LTV Corp. said its Vought Corp. aerospace subsidiary has an agreement with a British concern, Hunting Engineering Ltd., for marketing and possibly producing a disposable anti-tank weapon.

Vought will be prime contractor for the weapon, called LAW 80, and potential customers include the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army. J.J. Welch Jr., Vought senior vice president, said. A spokesman said that revenue from the project can't be estimated, but that it is "potentially a multimillion (dollar) venture."

Disposable weapons aren't new to the armed forces. Several different models of one-shot antitank weapons have been in use for as long as 20 years. Vought said its model is more accurate than other versions.

The shell LAW 80 fires can penetrate the frontal armor of tanks at ranges from point-blank to more than 500 yards, Vought said. The weapon is about five feet long and weighs less than 20 pounds. It is preloaded and discarded after use.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig went a step further on Saturday by accusing the Soviets of engaging in an "unprecedented" series of coordinated missile tests that closely correspond to a Soviet nuclear response in a war.

The tests were seen by Washington as contradictory to what the Soviets were being lauded for saying publicly.

It was in response to Haig's comments that Gromyko addressed himself Monday.

Haig and Gromyko conferred for more than nine hours during two days last week, talks which Haig characterized as "full, frank and useful." Fischer confirmed that one of the topics they discussed was the possibility of a summit meeting between Presidents Reagan and Leonid Brezhnev. No details were available, but Fischer said both sides have agreed that a summit must yield positive results and not be a "summit for the sake of summitry."

weapon arsenals.

Rep. Edward J. Derwinski, R-Ill., then interrupted the panel's mark-up session by invoking a point of order — customarily waived — under which committees can be prevented from meeting while the full House is in session on the floor.

Both Republicans and Democrats on the committee accused each other of trying to exploit the nuclear arms control issue for political purposes.

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## No Arms Agreement Without 'Generosity'

To the Editor:

The Administration's scolding dismissal of President Brezhnev's unilateral declaration that the Soviet Union will not be the first to use nuclear weapons is incomprehensible.

The enormous additions to the already huge nuclear stockpile projected for the 1980's have been justified as something to counter Soviet "nuclear blackmail." An explicit pledge not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, even if the U.S. refuses to reciprocate, is both important evidence of Soviet intentions in this regard and an inhibition on their resort to nuclear threats.

Secretary Haig is right that one purpose of the proposal was to make propaganda. If the Soviet Union makes concessions in order to project an image as a responsible, peace-loving nation, this is the sort of propaganda we should welcome and emulate.

The Secretary is wrong, however, when he says that the declaration is "non-verifiable." Were Mr. Brezhnev or his successor to violate the pledge, we would, unfortunately, know all too quickly. But a nation contemplating "nuclear blackmail" would derive no benefit from volunteering such a pledge. Since nuclear stockpiles would be unaffected, retaliation would be as credible in a "no-first-use" world as it is today. Indeed, probably more so, because of the outrage at Soviet duplicity.

The most disturbing aspect of the Administration's contemptuous response to an important initiative is that it casts doubt on American interest in reaching an arms agreement at all. There will be no agreement unless there is a degree of generosity on both sides.

If whenever the Soviets make a concession the Administration discounts it, it will reinforce the view within the Kremlin that no agreement is possible. Anything that lends support to the conviction in either country that there is no alternative to confrontation increases the danger of nuclear war.

RICHARD J. BARNET  
Senior FellowInstitute for Policy Studies  
Washington, June 17, 1982